97-84112-14

Harbord, James Guthrie

Again we dream while clouds gather

[New York]

[1935]

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
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Box 432 Harbord, James Guthrie, 1866-
Again we dream while clouds gather; address by ... James G. Harbord, delivered in the Civic forum series at the Town hall, New York city, January 3, 1935. [1935]
30 p.
[New York, Tow. Hall, 1935]
139396

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TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA

FILM SIZE: 35mm REDUCTION RATIO: 9:1 IMAGE PLACEMENT: IA (IIA) IB IIB

DATE FILMED: 6-6-97 INITIALS: PB

TRACKING # : 25001

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Again We Dream While Clouds Gather

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Box 432

BY
GENERAL JAMES G. HARBORD

Again We Dream While Clouds Gather

Address

BY

GENERAL JAMES G. HARBORD

DELIVERED IN THE CIVIC FORUM SERIES AT
THE TOWN HALL

NEW YORK CITY
JANUARY 3, 1935

Again We Dream While Clouds Gather

It is sixteen years since the bells rang out and the whistles shrieked the achievement of a great peace. After four years of war on a scale of which Napoleon never dreamed, there was to be a peace such as the world had never known before. "A war to end wars," had been the battle cry of millions of men. Faith in the accomplishment of that high ideal deepened the flush on the faces of the returning soldiers who marched up Fifth Avenue. The hope of it had quickened the last heart-beats of many who did not return.

Today the bells and deep-toned sirens no longer sound in tribute to peace. Instead, throughout an uneasy world, hammers ring against the steel of armaments. The shrill whistles of drill sergeants can be heard by those who listen closely. But our country does not listen closely. She is dreaming again, as she was in 1914. It is true that but once in her peaceful history has she fought in Europe. But that "History repeats itself" is based upon many centuries of unchanging human nature.

Causes of conflict are stronger than ever

While she dreams, the causes which drove her irresistibly toward that former conflict—for which she was so ill prepared—are stronger than ever. They are incessantly spurred by the world-wide economic situation. If the world was too small for the United States to remain neutral in 1917, think of its comparative size today. The globe has been shrunken

into a neighborhood by the increased speed of communications and the greater dependence of nations upon one another.

The United States insists she shall have unhampered passage upon the oceans of this contracting world. Freedom of the seas is an offspring of the doctrine of neutrality. It is a principle of our foreign policy enshrined in our history. As a nation of five millions of people Americans fought for it in the past; and, as a nation of one hundred and twenty-four millions, they may some day think it worth fighting for again.

Other great maritime powers hold exactly the opposite view. "In war," they say firmly, "the neutral flag may—and frequently does—protect enemy property." The view was expressed with characteristic forcefulness and clarity by William Pitt, one of the greatest statesmen who ever spoke our tongue. In 1801 he described freedom of the seas as a monstrous and unheard of principle by which an enemy is "insured against the effects of your own hostility."

Pitt's pronouncement still has force That pronouncement practically sums up the attitude of the maritime powers of today. While the passing of a hundred and thirty-four years has many times multiplied the volume of our ocean traffic, the idea Pitt expressed survives unchanged in the minds of many statesmen. The freedom of the seas was not won by President Wilson at Versailles. In any important future war belligerents will instantly look to America as a source for munitions and supplies. We will demand our right to respond to the extreme limit of our neutrality with any goods not contraband. Adverse belligerents will cling to the right of capture, the right of blockade, jurisdiction of their own prize

courts, and national control of their strategic maritime localities. Our shipping will be in the same difficulties as in the troubled years between 1914 and 1918. The climax will come no less, and perhaps even more swiftly.

The vast resources of the United States which lull into a false sense of security are among the most potent factors which might lead to embroilment in international controversies. A granary needs more watchmen than a poorhouse. Our country is the wealthiest on the earth in food supplies, metals, oil, manufactures, and agricultural products, and will never cease to attract envious eyes in a world in which nations struggle for economic advantage. Its treasure is equal to half that of all the other six great powers combined. In 1932 the National Industrial Conference Board estimated our national wealth to be 247 billion, 300 million dollars. Most of this is concentrated within our continental limits. The largest part of our industrial assets are centered in the Northeast and the Great Lakes region.

Foreign countries owe us huge sum Our country is rich not only in material assets, but also—more doubtfully—in promissory notes. A stupendous amount is owed us by foreign countries. On January 4, 1934, our government had on its books official obligations of other nations totalling more than 12 billion 710 million dollars. All except 416 million dollars of that was coming from European countries—if we use the word "coming" in the very loose way of meaning "still due." About one-third was owed by Great Britain, our heaviest debtor and our greatest commercial competitor. Stated in another way, every individual American has a stake of $1,012 in our governmental loans abroad. Payments are in default in nearly all cases.

Settlement negotiations have failed repeatedly. Non-payment of war debts is about the only issue on which practically all Europe seems to be in complete accord. In America public opinion runs in the other direction. Notwithstanding our government's attitude on its gold coupons American citizens generally have the old-fashioned notion that debtors should make good their word. We are not willing to cancel. There is not much we can do about it, except hope. If this stupendous sum were due from one country, we could, and probably would, bring effective pressure to bear. This indebtedness looms as a conflict of interests—with its own possibilities. No one loves us more because he owes us money.

Investments abroad larger than war debts Besides these governmental debts abroad, we have foreign investments, direct and portfolio, which reach a larger total than the so-called war debts. Thirteen billion, 799 millions in such investments are about evenly distributed in Canada, South America and Europe, with smaller amounts in Africa and the Far East. In those countries where returns on our private loans are in default, we are proceeding cautiously. It is our policy, as in the case of the war debts, not to stir up trouble. Our ultimate interests seem to be best served in this way at present. Yet the hard fact remains that our industry, trade and prosperity are—to the extent of more than 13 billion dollars—bound up in other countries. We are interested in keeping the peace, for this reason. But a war in which any of those countries went to pieces would mean material loss to us. It would make it harder for us to stand idly by and smile a disinterested international smile.

Foreign commerce a potent factor Then there is our foreign commerce. In 1931 the United States had 11.5 per cent of the world's total trade, ranking next to the British Commonwealth of Nations, which had 23.7 per cent. It is true that the amount of our goods consumed at home always has far outshadowed our exports. Even in the peak year of 1929, our exports were but 9.8 per cent of our total production. This holds out the possibility of following a purely nationalistic policy, if that should be to our best interests.

The trouble is that policy becomes increasingly less adequate to our interests. More than one hundred years ago Washington—soldier of the successful Revolution—looked forward to an entirely self-supporting America, going its own way serenely in safe and glorious isolation. Wise as he was, he could not have dreamed of the new era of mechanical invention that was soon to dawn; that rapid transportation and telegraphic contact by radio and cable would make isolation impossible; and that America would be compelled to take a part in world affairs. The increase of our exports by four times their value in the last thirty years is one of the manifestations of this new day. That increase will continue.

A great sea and air traffic is being developed in the service of this trade. American owned and operated ships now ply practically all important routes from the United States to the principal ports of the world. They carry about thirty-one per cent of the total dry cargoes of our foreign ocean commerce. The gross tonnage of our merchant marine is approximately twice what it was in 1914. Although the sea-borne commerce of our country was accelerated by the war, it originated long before Europe was thrown into turmoil by the murder of an Austrian Archduke,

inspecting a little city in the Balkans. Its expansion is closely linked with our industrial growth. The steady increase in the manufacture of new units even in the depression shows that, under private ownership, American shipping can and will compete with vessels under foreign flags. An effect from this upon our foreign responsibilities is unavoidable.

Aircraft presents a new problem Extensions of air lines from the United States to foreign points grew from 152 miles in 1926 to 22,790 miles in 1934. The carrying of passengers, express, freight and mail along these sky lanes has introduced a problem in international relations unknown ten years ago. In an American passenger plane flying over the border between Uruguay and Argentina bound for Brazil, a Frenchman is murdered by a Swede. Who takes jurisdiction in the case?

Such are some physical and economic factors containing seeds of potential discord which may take root if subjected to enough heat. If our outlook is to extend to a national life not limited to our own boundaries, we cannot disassociate ourselves from the repercussions of world affairs. International commitments by which our foreign policy is guided are less tangible, but are nevertheless pregnant with possibilities. So long as treaties are made by the President by and with the consent of the Senate, "provided two-thirds of the Senators present shall concur," our foreign policy will be apt to reflect the will of the majority of our people. It will be hesitant at times, and inconsistent at others, but trampling upon it will rouse to anger our usually apathetic countrymen. From the American viewpoint on international obligations, treaties are not mere scraps of paper.

We might fight for the Monroe Doctrine I already have spoken of freedom of the seas as a principle for which the United States has fought, and still cherishes as worth fighting for. The Monroe Doctrine is another one. The present tendency is to interpret the Monroe Doctrine as an understanding between ourselves and other nations denying them any right of intervention in Latin-American countries. We thus become in a sense the guarantors of non-American rights in Central and South America. Between us and Latin American countries the doctrine is currently interpreted as an understanding for cooperation against any non-American threat, with an agreement against intervention by force in any case.

The danger of armed European aggression in South America probably has disappeared. It has been replaced by a peaceful penetration through trade and by European colonization. Are South American economic interests and ours so mutual and complementary that they would not permit the formation of powerful groups or interests antagonistic to our trade and consequently hostile to us as a result of such peaceful penetration? Our present liberal attitude could hardly be expected to stand the strain of hostility toward us, fostered by foreign influence in any of the large South American countries.

Our policy of non-recognition of territorial changes in the Orient resulting from armed action, enunciated by Secretary Stimson, was early adopted by the present administration and seems to have been generally approved in America and also in European nations. It appears to commit us as favoring the territorial status quo, even though that status quo, itself, resulted from force in the past. The avowed

programs of Nazi Germany and the militant Fascists also are against it. Freezing European frontiers will be serious for at least a hundred years after the Treaty of Versailles. For the future the point we must keep in mind is that any attempted territorial changes in Europe will cause invaded nations to call on us for a statement of our position. We appear to have definitely aligned ourselves for boundaries as they now exist.

About our right to control immigration and exclude certain immigrants there is no more doubt in the mind of the average American than there is in regard to freedom of the seas, the Monroe Doctrine, and the non-recognition of territorial changes by force. Our immigration law, especially if ungraciously enforced, does not add to the number of our friends.

When Americans go abroad on peaceful errands they expect the protection of their government and it rightly assumes the obligation. At the beginning of last year 429,209 Americans were living in other countries. Half of them were in Western Canada; about 100,000 were in Europe, and the remainder were distributed fairly equally among Mexico, South America, the West Indies, and Asia. Protection of this group parallels to a great extent the protection accorded our foreign commerce. Many in it represent American business and trade.

The "open door" is a basic policy Almost any kind of an American will agree that our citizens should be permitted to travel freely on the seas and in foreign countries, enjoying the same privileges that are granted citizens of other countries. We insist on our

right of "open door" accessibility to sources of raw material and world markets, subject to the reserved rights of each nation. Finally we expect to invest our money and conduct our business abroad under a safeguard from foreign laws equal to that granted other nationals.

This brief summary of a few of the influences at work is ample evidence that through her vast resources, her commerce, her war debts, foreign investments, and her policies, the United States is in a give-and-take relationship with a restless world, no matter how aloof she may wish to be. A glance at a few obvious facts will show just how restless that world is.

Wars and threats of wars multiply The last few months have seen several armed conflicts. Bolivia has fought with Paraguay over the Gran Chaco oil resources. France has completed her conquest of Morocco. There has been revolution and civil war in Spain. Japan has fought against China, and China has fought not only the Japanese but her own communists.

There have been threats of war in half a dozen disagreements: Italy with Jugoslavia over the freedom of the Adriatic. Between France and Germany over the Saar and other differences. Russia against Poland and Germany over the Ukraine. Japan with Russia over control of the northeast Asiatic coast. Japan and China for control of North China. Jugoslavia against Hungary for the murder of their King.

All the great nations of Europe are engaged in the economic struggle for protection of their own industries and the suppression of alien competition. The British Empire and Japan are contesting for empire and world markets. We can only hope that the present balance of

antagonistic forces in Europe can be maintained until a leader appears who can negotiate satisfactory settlements. The hope grows dimmer with every passing month. Before such a leader appears one of the sparks caused by the constant friction may fall into the powder. Fears of war are born in Europe. There rusts and corrodes the key to world peace while the nations bicker.

With the possible results of violent collisions between nationalistic ambitions we are only too familiar from the long and sad experience of the past. Under the troubled surface throughout the world today, however, a new foment bubbles. It spills over beyond national boundaries to imperil continued peace. Nearly every country is seething with social unrest.

Rival philosophies bid for power Fascism, socialism and communism are rival philosophies of government, each carrying its own dangers to the institutions for which the United States has fought since the days of the American Revolution. All these "isms" believe that democracy has served its purpose and is on the way out. All join in criticizing our national institutions. They bore upon us from without and from within. While small groups in our country clamor for more radical methods, we are frankly experimenting with the redistribution of political, social and economic power. Those who are anxious that such experiments may go on, presumably under the aegis of the Constitution, may find it vital to be able to defend them from outside interference.

Such are some of the sour notes which catch the ear now, jangling out of tune in the great world orchestra. How much chance is there that we can write a new score on clean white paper and change this discordant hubbub into a

swelling symphony of peace? The best way to decide the odds in favor of that consummation, so devoutly to be wished, is to consider the results of efforts that have been made for international agreements. The futility of expecting peace through solemn pledges alone is well illustrated by what has followed the Briand-Kellogg and the Nine-Power pacts.

What followed the Briand-Kellogg pact By the former agreement all nations renounced war as an instrument of national policy. Since that great dramatic renunciation the expenditures and organization of practically every large nation—for non-aggressive self-defense, of course—have increased rapidly. Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Russia and England are all better prepared to fight today than ten years ago. Japan has been at war in Manchuria, and France in Morocco. The rumbles from Germany are far from reassuring. There is more talk of war, and more money is spent getting ready for it than before war was outlawed. The mention of the odious outlawed act called "War" is avoided quite simply by omitting a formal declaration before the shooting begins. It saves the pacifist face and stimulates the belief that the soldiers are playing "ring around the rosie," if the real name of the game is not announced.

The Nine-Power Pact was to bring new and sweeter pacifism to the Pacific Ocean. Negotiation between the signers was to settle any dispute over Far Eastern questions. Any signatory has the right to call a conference. But for the last three years a major conflict between two signers, involving important interests of two others, has gone on—but no signer yet has sent out invitations for a formal talk.

The value of European non-aggression pacts is open to question so long as they do not include *all* interested parties in a given region. They are generally multi-lateral, and provide that no party shall invade the other's territory, nor join with any third nation who might do so. Germany and Poland have signed a non-aggression agreement which—so long as Germany covets the Ukraine—virtually cancels the Russo-Polish one. So long as Germany is out of the Eastern European pacts and Bulgaria and Hungary are out of the Balkan pacts, the general effect of the agreements is simply to array superior force against those nations. Non-aggression pacts as a practical matter may actually prevent solution of national economic and political differences and tempt outsiders to use force as the only way of escaping restraints.

All nations cling to sovereign rights International disarmament negotiations have been under way for more than eight years. This worthy endeavor started with the preparatory commission in 1926 and reached its climax in the General Disarmament Conference of 1932. For the last two years it has been in practically continuous session through its general commission or subsidiary committees. Its principal value has been in disclosing the following principles: No nation will disarm that feels itself insecure. None will give up essential elements of its national defense for any compensation, the value of which has not been established by experience. All nations are reluctant to surrender sovereign rights to any international league. General disarmament agreements between nations are impractical; regional agreements are more practical.

To date no agreements have been reached, no convention signed—and the disarmament talks appear to have widened the breach between France and Germany. Ending the conference without agreement would lessen the League's prestige and mean the resumption by Germany of its liberty of action on armaments. To keep the conference going without Germany shows how impractical are the methods by which it is striving for its ideals.

Repeated knocks from hard experience have put deep crimps in the fond belief of the first decade after the war, that the problem of international peace could be settled by frank conversations between foreign secretaries, running all over the world visiting one another. The General Disarmament Conference did not blow away war clouds. The London Economic Conference did not end the depression. The Montevideo Conference was considered successful because no blows were exchanged openly. Conferences appear to be going out of style.

Post-war liberalism losing influence Post-war liberalism has given way to a general feeling that little is to be hoped from international cooperation. Are hard-headed statesmen swinging again to the idea that treaties and pacts are "scraps of paper," which may only feed the flames when a match is applied? International yearnings are being replaced by a policy of strictest nationalism, with force to back it. The visible growth of armaments is proof enough. I grant the fact that each nation must be prepared to look out for itself, in its turn, engenders a further feeling of insecurity and tends to discourage peace. But I am talking of things as they are—not as we would like to see them. Throughout the world

there is a typical pre-war psychosis, easily distinguished from the post-war relaxation and desire for reconstruction.

In a situation so full of possibilities for an outbreak of violence that ultimately might involve us, it is not safe for the United States to be so afraid of preparedness that no other large nation will be afraid of her. It is high time to face facts on how we would stand if we were dragged into war.

How we stand in means of defense Here are some facts. The United States has fewer soldiers in its active army and air force, per mile of frontier, than any other power. Its thirteen for each mile compares with 47 for Russia and Germany, for example, and 210 for France. We have far fewer active and reserve soldiers in our Army and Air Corps for every thousand square miles of our territory than any other large country. Our 116 for every thousand square miles makes a poor showing indeed against the 13,995 in Germany, 14,958 in Japan, 32,019 in France, and 54,034 in Italy. The figures in both cases are for the mother country only, exclusive of colonial possessions.

The same discouraging disparity is shown in the number of active and reserve soldiers for each one thousand of population. The 5.2 average of the United States sets the low for all great powers, the averages for other countries ranging rapidly upward to totals of 154 for Italy and 162.4 for France.

The national defense expenditures of other nations in proportion to their total expenditures tell a similar story. In the proportion of their expenditures for 1933, including only appropriations made for and spent in that year, the United States is behind all but Germany and

Russia. Our preparations for defense that year represented 13.4 per cent of our total expenditures; those of France, 29.42 per cent; Italy's 30.21 per cent; and Japan's 36.9 per cent.

Our defense lags as others build theirs A downward trend is shown in our national defense expenditures since 1930, while those of other powers, except the British Commonwealth of Nations, have shown a sharp upward climb. When I speak of Germany's outlay in this connection, I refer only to that which appears on the War Department Budget. A great deal of apprehension has been felt in Europe as to military preparations in Germany not shown in open accounts.

Summing up our position, we are second at sea, fourth in the air, and last in land armed forces of all the great nations of the world.

That summary is alarming to all who are familiar with our military requirements in the event of war, and who realize the present precarious state of peace. In view of our geographic situation and our national feeling against anything even remotely resembling "militarism," let us consider only the irreducible minimum for safety.

The rock-bottom safety factor is to have a strong enough Army and Navy to hold off an invader until we can mobilize our people and our resources in case of attack. In a future war we might not have allies keeping the enemy in check until we train civilians in hastily assembled camps and transform our peace-time factories into munitions works. The now historic "hands across the sea" may be extended with rifles in them.

Our immediate needs for defense are to guarantee our mobilization against interference from any source, by any means; to provide for a rapid and efficient mobilization of the nation's man power, industry, and resources, and to guarantee the security of our critical overseas areas. Those are factors which enable a peaceful nation to hold off attack. An ultimate safety factor would be the preparation, behind this first-shock protection, for the subsequent employment of the offensive in overwhelming strength. In the long run we could not safely rest with the mere repulse of attackers pounding at our gates.

The defense of our coast and overseas possessions requires sea power enough, in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, to cover critical areas against the primary onslaught, and to hold off the enemy until naval reinforcements sufficient to establish superiority of strength can arrive from the ocean where no immediate danger threatens. I am deliberately avoiding an emphasis on the possibility that we might be attacked on both the Atlantic and the Pacific at the same time, so that none may say that I am exaggerating reasonable hazards.

A stronger Navy is essential Under favorable conditions the major elements of the fleet could be assembled and transferred from ocean to ocean through the Panama Canal in twenty days. That is less time than it would take to form and dispatch an important convoy against us from either Asiatic or European ports. We cannot hope to equal the strength of all possible naval combinations, but our national defense interests do demand a Navy equal to that of our strongest possible opponent. We haven't that today, although we seem to be moving toward it.

A late awakening after a peaceful dream Beginning in 1922, when we voluntarily gave up more naval tonnage than any other nation in order to reach an agreement on naval ratios, we followed for eleven years the policy of encouraging disarmament by example. To indicate our strong desire for curtailment we went to the length of not replacing over-age and obsolete ships. We fell far behind the two other great naval powers, Great Britain and Japan. We have faithfully observed our obligation to maintain the military status quo in our possessions west of Hawaii. We are mandatory for no territory in that region.

Even idealistic America decided she was playing a lone hand by 1933 and that her policy was seriously weakening her safety and prestige. Her awakening was followed by the authorization and appropriation for some thirty-seven vessels of various types, leaving us 102 vessels of all types short of our authorized treaty strength. Although we still will be considerably below Great Britain and only about equal to Japan in 1936, the Vinson Building Law gives the Navy for the first time in our history a business-like replacement program for ships, and a logical and orderly plan for the procurement of naval aircraft and personnel.

This law looks forward to the gradual building of the Navy to full treaty strength of underage ships. We hope that will never be necessary: that in future international conferences agreements will be reached under which other nations will reduce their naval tonnages to our level in existing ratios. All we would need to do then would be to balance our naval force and replace ships as they become over-age. If other nations insist on holding their navies at present full treaty strength, and in view of Imperial Japan's

denunciation of the Naval Treaty, national safety demands our following the Vinson Building plan to completion. In the meantime it gives us something to bargain with in future conferences looking toward armament reduction. Our reductions can take the form of curtailing the program rather than scrapping good ships.

The Regular Army and National Guard We need more than a Navy and its complementary air equipment, however, to provide an adequate covering force for protection of our national mobilization. The Regular Army and the National Guard also are essential.

While the lessons of the World War were fresh in our minds, the National Defense Act of June 4, 1920, authorized a peace strength Regular Army of 17,728 officers and 280,000 enlisted men. General Staff studies, in attempts to carry out the requirements with every possible reduction in cost, have arrived at an absolute minimum slightly lower, 14,063 officers and 165,000 enlisted men. But Congress has gone below that absolute minimum. By successive cuts in appropriations it has reduced the Regular Army to an average approximate strength of only 12,000 officers, 118,750 enlisted men, and 6,500 Philippine Scouts, which last we shall lose probably this year.

When it is considered that the Regular Army is not only the guard against surprise attack but also the nucleus around which a citizen army would have to be built in time of emergency, the gravity of present conditions becomes more apparent. Four peace strength infantry divisions (one for each of the four army commands), three peace strength cavalry divisions, a mechanized cavalry brigade and a General Headquarters Air Force, with some auxiliary units is the least that safety demands as an initial covering force.

Without neglecting its other equally important missions, the present Regular Army could not provide that force. General MacArthur, Chief of Staff, made that clear in his testimony in June, 1934, on the Thompson Bill hearings, when he said:

> "Three major missions we cannot now perform. I must choose which of these missions I will attempt, well knowing the failure of one may result in failure in all.
>
> "We must keep our outposts; we must stop the invader; and we must mobilize. Today I would be unable to do so. Any two I might accomplish, but all three, impossible."

In a sudden major emergency, after decision has been made to use troops in addition to those of the Regular Army, we have to depend first upon the National Guard. Here, again, the United States is lacking. The National Defense Act provided a total National Guard of 435,800 officers and enlisted men by 1924. Each succeeding Congress has failed to appropriate necessary funds. The War Department attempted to get enough for a Guard of 250,000, and the Chief of the Militia Bureau tried for one of 210,000. Both attempts failed. Since 1930 appropriations have limited the Guard to 190,211.

Enlisted Reserve a mere handful The Officers' Reserve Corps could supplement our commissioned personnel, but there is no reserve from which trained enlisted men could be quickly drawn. There are approximately six thousand men in our Enlisted Reserve Corps, a mere handful. The shortage of Regular Army reserves is a great deficiency in our defense. The National Guard might have more time to fill up gaps with local volunteers,

but its efficiency would be directly affected by the number of untrained men it had to use.

An Officers' Reserve Corps of 120,000 active reserve officers is essential to meet the needs of emergency mobilization. Last reports showed a total of about 113,000. By all means we should keep up our work of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps and our Citizens' Military Training Camps to augment the number of men with some groundwork of military schooling who can and will step forward if a call to arms should sound.

The tremendous size which adds to the greatness of our country adds also to the difficulty of protecting it. We have sea and land frontiers of more than 8,000 miles, second only to those of Russia among the world powers. For guarding them—with fewer soldiers per mile than any other great nation, remember—it is impractical to hold the bulk of our Army in a central position. It would be too far from the possible danger points. We must maintain four zones, each necessarily organized, garrisoned and supplied as a possible independent theatre of operations.

The Panama Canal and its protection The problem is further complicated by the Panama Canal, our overseas possessions, and aviation. The Canal is a vital point for the whole maritime world. Not only must it be defended but we must be able to keep open the lines of communication to and from it. To make that certain our possessions in the West Indies, as bases near the entrance to the Caribbean, must be guarded from any act of war.

Hawaii must have a covering force capable of sustained and separate action. On it—in this day of aircraft, especially—depends the security of our West Coast and West Coast trade. And while we retain a holding in the Far East, Hawaii

is an advanced base essential for the protection of our Far Eastern possessions. We cannot be too strong in Hawaii.

Alaska presents increasing difficulties The importance of Alaska is growing constantly and its defense problems—air, land and naval—must be calculated independently of our continental needs. It has a maximum resident strength of only 4,000 white men qualified for military service. The economic resources of Alaska and Kurile Islands regions are gazed upon covetously by others. Polar flying and improved navigation aids have reduced the protection climate once afforded. The time may come unexpectedly when keeping a few hundred men in Alaska to protect her from foreign invasion will not be enough.

The strategic value of the Philippines depends on our Far Eastern Policy. So long as that policy insists on equal trade opportunities with China with freedom of transit for our goods and purchases to and from Asiatic ports, a base in the Western Pacific is demanded. The present choice of our statesmen seems to be to surrender this advantage, but the ultimate decision will not be made for ten years. In the meantime, it is our obligation to protect and police these islands and our sea-trade routes. We could not do it in a war with the defensive means now available. From a military standpoint the Philippines, now indefensible because of the Treaty of 1922, are neither an asset nor a liability. In the event of a foreign war those Islands would be at the disposition of the victor no matter who occupied them in the meantime.

Aviation enables us to strike swiftly at an enemy, but it makes it possible for an enemy to strike at us with equal speed. It cuts down our

geographic isolation. Only at our peril can we fail to take it into account. Aviation has its balanced place. It may start the next war. Conservative and well-informed opinion is that aviation, alone, can never win a major war.

A move is under way now to correct the present deplorable condition of our Army Air Corps. A program calling for a total of 2,320 planes—almost double what the Army now has —offers a patriotic opportunity to the present Congress. It is to be hoped that Congress will grant the increase.

I have indicated some of the more obvious gaps in our permanent defense structure that would invite an active enemy. One might think that with so little of a permanent nature on which to rely, we would be ready at an instant's notice to draw upon our much-boasted resources. But not yet! Despite the fact that history shows we cannot depend on volunteers, despite the essential urgency of speed in the unhappy event of war, we have not yet on our statute books an authorization for the Commander-in-Chief, the President, to call men to the colors, by selective service. We must still depend on our legislators to pass the laws after the threat arises—while precious days are wasted. In April, 1917, Congress provided no adequate funds for more than a month after it declared war.

Industrial mobilization is vital in war As with men, so with material. Industrial organization, so vital in modern war, must keep step with the mobilization of men. The War Department and our industries now cooperate in peace-time planning so far as possible. But that is not nearly so far as is found possible in other strong nations. "Ultimately," many say in serene self-confidence,

"we could turn out materials and supplies faster than other countries." Ultimately is a long, long road in a crisis. Other countries are better equipped to meet war demands at the outset. After nineteen months in the World War, no American built airplane was on the front when the Armistice was signed on November 11, 1918. Only a few shots were fired from American built artillery. What might happen before we really got started? A law enabling the President to mobilize industry without delay is as necessary as a law permitting him to mobilize men. If possible, the profit motive should not be allowed to enter. The reiteration of this axiomatic fact wins the front page for some statesman nearly every week. When men are offering their lives, industry should be ready to give its services without gain.

Our advance arrangements for assembling materials for war are inadequate enough, but the current munitions investigation may cause misinterpretations which will cripple them. The amount of munitions sold abroad by American firms is trivial. There is in this country not a single manufacturing concern exclusively engaged in ordnance production, nor in any other such property described as munitions except to an insignificant extent.

Thoughtless claims may dim perspective A perspective is hard to maintain amid wild claims and counter-claims. We have even heard the argument that collusion by munitions men was indicated in the World War, because the French and Germans did not fire on coal and iron fields. A little thought will throw light on that. Naturally each side desired to save such fields, believing it had a chance to take them for its own use, an accomplishment

that would have ended the war in a hurry. The strategy of General Pershing's plan for the final drive in 1918 was to cut the Germans off from those precious stores of coal and iron. The French were influenced, of course, not only by the great war value of the territory but also by the reluctance to bombard Alsace-Lorraine, where the population was largely French, and to recover which was never absent from French hearts.

Other powers assure munitions supplies Other powers maintain large enough subsidized and government owned munition plants to meet their needs. The United States, in time of war, depends almost entirely on private manufacture. Curtailment of this manufacture, by denying its outlets, would work to our disadvantage and to the advantage of possible enemies. Prohibiting the exportation of arms, munitions, or implements of war favors the powerful aggressor, who prepares for a short war of conquest by accumulating supplies. It handicaps the nations who do not make elaborate plans.

In all our major wars in the past we have had to obtain munitions from foreign shores. In the Revolutionary War they came from France and Holland; in the Civil War from France, Great Britain, Belgium and Austria; in the Spanish-American War from Great Britain; in the World War from France and Great Britain.

The question of exclusive government manufacture of arms in our country was thoroughly examined and completely rejected when war was imminent eighteen years ago. An exhaustive study of nationalization was made, and in the matter of comparative costs found that the Government, with no selling expense, no taxes, no insurance, except to pay fire and accident

losses at actual cost, and borrowing money as only the Government can borrow, beat the purchase price on articles made by private enterprise by about 11 per cent. The Government now operates six manufacturing arsenals in a small way. These at full capacity could produce less than 5 per cent of our requirements for a major war. This nationalized industry to handle the major war load would have to be immediately expanded to nineteen times its present capacity. A conservative estimate of the value of those six arsenals is $163,000,000. One hundred per cent capacity for war-time need would mean first cost of $3,097,000,000 for plant. Capitalize it at 3% and you have an annual carrying charge of $92,910,000 on plant and equipment. That takes no account of amortization or obsolescence or a payroll of several million dollars per year. This vast establishment during a long interval of peace would, I venture to believe, never be operated. Witness several similar idle elephants surviving from war days—for example, the $65,000,000 nitrate plant at Muscle Shoals idle for fifteen years. If you nationalize rifles, why stop short of nationalizing the machinery, the raw materials, the powder, and for the powder, the cotton, nitric acid and alcohol?

Searching out the real truth about munitions is in the public interest. The chance for harm lies in twisting isolated and unrelated facts for front-page purposes. Such distortions, even when they strike at our own safety, find many sympathetic ears in our nation. We are temperamentally opposed to war. In that attitude—so commendable in itself—is found the real reason we have no preparedness program that any other power of our size would consider sufficient.

Minding our business doesn't guarantee peace We cannot escape quarrels and conflicts by minding our own business. Our business is too extensive and far-reaching. It interferes with the business of too many other nations. We have invaded all markets and penetrated all continents. The more we expand our industrial establishments and agricultural plant, the more we shall require those outlets, which Europe and Asia must also secure as they further enlarge productivity through efficient practices and surplus-creating equipment.

We may point to the past in evidence that we have never waged a war of conquest. But the fact remains that our occupancy of markets once dominated by other powers constitutes economic invasion and curtails their opportunity to sell goods, increase employment, improve living standards and provide income for their several populations.

We are too rich to rely on bare hands From the days of Rome, the wars of trade and the trade of war have proceeded side by side. We are too rich, we are too powerful in commerce and industry to confide our destiny to bare hands and the protection of treaties. International faith perished on the borders of Belgium, and international honor as represented by war debts is buried in the vaults of the United States Treasury. As the greatest creditor nation in history, we are suddenly the most unpopular. Our wealth, our shrewdness and our competitive strength thwart universal plans and ambitions. We cannot keep our flag at home when we send our goods and our salesmen abroad. And if we are not prepared to defend our trade and our citizens, they must ultimately yield right of way and outlets to those powers whose present posi-

tion and future growth depend upon the export of goods they cannot domestically absorb.

We cannot determine by a pacifist policy whether or not we shall have another war. Our commercial policy may at any moment involve us in complications that demand ultimatums and an iron hand. If the time ever comes when we are unable to enforce our just rights, American industry will be prostrated by discriminatory treaties, further defaulted obligations, and exclusion from irreplaceable markets.

Grave danger lurks in defenseless wealth It is a dangerous thing to be rich and defenseless. Therefore, our country, whatever its inclination, must maintain a military and naval strength imposing enough to discourage affront and aggression—sufficient to protect the liberties and property of its subjects, and modern enough to cope with any emergency or armament that challenges our safety.

The better we are prepared for war, the less we are likely to face it. Experience does not confirm the dictum that "right is might," without an enforcing agency. The Incas and the Montezumas and the Ming Emperors stand in spirit beside me tonight to testify how perilous it is to create vast empires and confide their safety to Providence. And the incredible rise of the Japanese people from a recently insignificant and impotent estate to a challenging position in world affairs—an achievement consummated within the short span of my own lifetime—warns us that no generation can ever anticipate with what new and suddenly potent forces the next must cope.

If we desire to prosper in peace, then we must be stronger than those who plan to profit by

war. Our defenses, by land and sea, must be so impressive that no power will be encouraged to provoke our enmity. I know of no insurance policy that may be purchased as cheaply. Those who protest at the consequent burden upon national income will be well advised to consider the alternative cost of impotence against an effective enemy. And those who shrink at the thought of bearing arms for the defense of the nation would be wise to contemplate the compulsory service which a successful enemy would exact from our youth if this should ever become a conquered province.

We dare not disarm at a moment when racial hatreds and megalomanias, world over, are trooping to the colors—while enlarged fleets, armies and air squadrons everywhere inform us that ancient grudges are feeding fat again through Europe and Asia—and the tramp of training millions shakes the world. The battlefields on which we thought the last great war had been fought were sowed with dragons' teeth, and the Almighty alone knows when and what the harvest will be.

Earnest, sincere men and women by the thousands feel sure that we would be on better terms with the rest of the world if we demonstrated pacific intentions by abolishing even our present inadequate military establishment; in brief—that being unable to defend ourselves will protect us from violence. But helplessness did not save Belgium, any more than it saved Peru and Mexico from the Spaniards, or China from the Manchus.

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